Epidemiology and Investigation of Foot‐and‐Mouth Disease (FMD) in the Republic of Korea by Yoon, Hachung et al.
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
Chapter 1
Epidemiology and Investigation of Foot‐and‐Mouth
Disease (FMD) in the Republic of Korea
Hachung Yoon, Wooseog Jeong, Jida Choi,
Yong Myung Kang and Hong Sik Park
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/63975
Provisional chapter
pide iology and Investigation of Foot‐and‐Mouth Disease
(FMD) in the Republic of Korea
Hachung Yoon, Wooseog Jeong, Jida Choi,
Yong Myung Kang and Hong Sik Park
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
Abstract
This chapter describes about the experience of dealing with FMD outbreaks in the
Republic of Korea. We explain what is FMD, the concept of epidemiological investiga‐
tion on outbreak sites of FMD, including the episode of detecting the index case for
seven epidemics occurred since 2000, and information obtained from investigation in
Korea. In any case, farmers’ attitude (recognize clinical signs and report suspected cases)
played the essential role in determining size and duration of epidemics. A rapid and
correct diagnosis including clinical examination and laboratory test for confirmation is
also important.
Keywords: foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD), investigation, control measures, surveil‐
lance, Republic of Korea
1. Introduction
Foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) caused by virus infection of a small non‐enveloped ribonucleic
acid (RNA) virus belongs to family Picornaviridae, genus Aphthovirus. FMD virus affects
Cloven‐hoofed domestic  animals  including cattle,  pig,  sheep,  goat,  deer,  boar,  and wild
animals. Due to its high contagiousness, FMD has a great potential for causing severe economic
loss. There are seven immunologically distinct serotypes of FMD virus: O (Oise Valley), A
(Allemand), C, Asia1, SAT (southern African territories)‐1, SAT‐2, SAT‐3. According to the
homogeneity of gene sequence of VP1 protein (approximately 639 base pairs, bps), the virus’
topotype (concerns to the location) and lineage (concerns to the ancestor) are further catego‐
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rized. RNA viruses show frequent spontaneous mutation, which results in emergence of new
lineages. Phylogenetic analysis allows tracking the evolution and the origin of strains [1].
Clinical signs of FMD are characterized by vesicles in foot, mouth, and teats. Virus starts
excreting 2 days before the appearance of clinical signs (4 days in case of milk), and antibody
can be detected from 3‐5 days after the appearance of clinical signs. High levels of antibodies
are reached 2–4 days later and remained for many months. The virus disappears upon the
appearance of antibody in most parts of the body. However, it continues to be detected
exceptionally in laryngo‐pharyngeal fluid. Antibodies to FMD virus are directed against
structural proteins (SP) in the viral capsid and non‐structural proteins (NSP) in the process of
virus replication. SP antibodies are relatively serotype specific and induced by both vaccination
and infection. Meanwhile, NSP antibodies are not serotype specific and induced by infection
but rarely by non‐purified vaccine also. SP antibodies usually start to appear approximately
3–4 days after the appearance of clinical signs, while 6–7 days in case of NSP antibodies [2, 3].
FMD occurs throughout the world, mainly in countries of Asia, Africa and parts of South
America. It is the first disease for which the OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health)
established an official list of free countries upon the science‐based standards, guidelines and
recommendations [4]. The Republic of Korea had been free from FMD without vaccination for
the past 66 years, before a the outbreak of FMD in March 2000. In this chapter, epidemics of
FMD in Korea from 2000 to 2015 are described together with their epidemiological character‐
istics.
2. Epidemics of FMD in Korea
Since 2000, Korea has experienced seven epidemics of FMD: March–April 2000, May–June
2002, January 2010, April–May 2010, November 2010–April 2011, July–August 2014, and
December 2014–April 2015 [Table 1 and Figure 1].
Year
Month
(Index
region)
2000 2002 2010 2014
January
(Pocheon)
April
(Ganghwa)
November
(Andong)
July
(Euseong)
December
(Jincheon)
Epidemic
period
3.24–4.15
(23 days)
5.2–6.23
(53 days)
1.2–1.29
(28 days)
4.8–5.6
(29 days)
’10.11.28
–’11.4.21
(145 days)
7.23–8.6
(15 days)
’14.12.3
–’15.4.28
(147 days)
Number of
outbreaks
15 16 6 11 153 3 185
Regions
affected
6 counties
in 3
provinces 
4 counties
in 2
provinces 
2 counties
in 1
province 
4 counties
in 4
provinces 
75 counties
in 11
provinces 
3 counties
in 2
provinces 
33 counties
in 7 provinces
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Year
Month
(Index
region)
2000 2002 2010 2014
January
(Pocheon)
April
(Ganghwa)
November
(Andong)
July
(Euseong)
December
(Jincheon)
Serotype O
(Pan‐Asia
O1) 
O
(Pan‐Asia
O1) 
A O
(SEA)
O
(SEA)
O
(SEA)
O
(SEA)
Slaughter
(No. of
animals)
12,216 from
182 farms
160,155
from 162
farms 
5,956 from
55 farms 
49,874 from
395 farms 
3,479,000
from 6,241
farms 
2,009 from
3 farms 
172,798 from
196 farms
Vaccination Ring None None None Nationwide Nationwide Nationwide
Table 1. Epidemics of FMD in Korea from 2000 to 2015.
Figure 1. Distribution of outbreak farms of FMD in Korea from 2000 to 2015.
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2.1. Epidemic in 2000
A suspected case was first reported from a dairy cattle farm in Paju, Gyeonggi‐do, on 20 March
2000. Serotype O FMD virus was identified, which included in the Pan‐Asian topotype. The
route of virus introduction into Korea remains unclear. Fifteen outbreaks were reported until
15 April 2000. The outbreaks were concentrated in six counties of three provinces. There was
one outbreak per county with the exception of one county, Hongseong, Chungcheongnam‐do,
from which 10 outbreaks were reported. All of the outbreaks in this epidemic involved cattle
farm. A total of 2,216 cloven‐hoofed animals of 182 farms were destroyed including all infected
and neighbor farms within 500 m radius. Emergency vaccination (double‐oil emulsion
vaccines containing inactivated FMD virus strain O1 Manisa) of all susceptible animals within
3 km of radius of outbreak farms was performed. During the first round, 860,700 animals and
661,770 for the second booster round had been vaccinated by August 2000. All vaccinated
animals except for soon to be slaughtered finishing pigs were indicated with ear marking either
by punching holes (pigs) or by branding (cattle, goat, and deer). The animals have been
registered and maintained by county offices to be directly transferred to designated slaugh‐
terhouses. Between first and second round of vaccinations, a total of 198,930 animals have been
either slaughtered through a government buying out program or sent to the designated
slaughterhouses. In the vaccinated zones, clinical inspections by field veterinarians as well as
statistically designed serological surveillance were performed [5]. The country regained the
previous status of FMD free country without vaccination from the OIE in September 2001.
2.2. Epidemic in 2002
On 2 May 2002, a suspect case with vesicles on the nose, tongue, hoof and teat, deletion of
hooves, and high mortality in piglets was reported at a pig farm located in Anseong, Gyeonggi‐
do. The second case was reported the next day at a pig farm in Jincheon, Chungcheongbuk‐
do. Serotype O FMD was confirmed on a total of 16 farms (15 pig farms and one cattle farm).
It was concluded that the use of vaccines was not advisable for this epidemic. The following
facts explain the reasons: The outbreaks were in intensive pig farming areas and some
surrounding farms would already likely be infected; period required for pigs to gain immunity
is 2–3 weeks, during which they would still be vulnerable to infection; the use of vaccination
would prolong the required period to regain FMD free status; there was a risk of spread by
vaccination teams; and vaccination would hinder the effectiveness of surveillance, making it
difficult to detect any new FMD cases. Most of all, the epidemic was not spreading out of control
[6].
2.3. Epidemic in January 2010
A private veterinarian notified early symptoms indicative of FMD such as loss of appetite and
hyper‐salivation on a dairy cattle farm in Pocheon, Gyeonggi‐do, on 2 January 2010. Local
veterinary service visited the farm, but lack of FMD‐specific lesions at that time interfered a
proper sampling for laboratory test. The farm was placed under close observation. On 6
January, FMD‐specific lesions including erosion and ulcer in oral cavity and nasal passage, as
well as ulcer and crust on teats, were observed. FMD virus serotype A was confirmed. All of
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six cases in cattle farm in this epidemic were detected within 3.8 km radius from the first
outbreak farm [7].
2.4. Epidemic in April to May 2010
An outbreak of FMD serotype O was confirmed on April 9, following the previous day's
notification of vesicles in the mouth and teats from a Hanwoo (Korean native beef cattle) farm
in Ganghwa county of Incheon metropolis. As the second to fifth outbreaks, all occurred in the
adjacent area, control measures including preemptive culling for all susceptible livestock in
the protection zones within 3 km, were focused to prevent further spread of FMD. Extensive
disinfection was carried out passing through two bridges connecting the Ganghwa Island to
the mainland. Despite these collective efforts, on 21 April, a suspected case was reported at a
pig farm located 135 km away from the previous outbreak area. Additional two outbreaks
occurred in the latter area, Cheongyang, Chungcheongnam‐do, by 6 May. Comparison of the
VP1 region of FMD viruses isolated from the infected farms showed 99.68–100% homology,
suggesting that all of 11 outbreaks were from a same origin [7].
2.5. Epidemic in November 2010 to April 2011
FMD occurred three times in 2010 (January, April, and November). The first case of the third
epidemic was reported on 28 November 2010, from one of the five pig farms in a complex in
Andong, Gyeongsangbuk‐do. When officers of national veterinary services arrived in the farm,
approximately 700 dead piglets were piled up in the farm yard. They found out that FMD was
already widespread in all five piggeries. The oldest lesion was observed at the innermost farm.
Until 21 April 2011, for 145 days, FMD outbreaks were confirmed in 153 farms raising cattle,
pigs, goats, or deer in 75 counties of 11 provinces. Serotype O SEA topotype (Mya‐98 lineage)
was isolated. Phylogenetic analysis showed nucleotide differences more or less 1.0% among
FMD virus of outbreak farms. In early December 2010, FMD broke out primarily on Hanwoo
(Korean native beef cattle) farms around the index case in Andong. However, on 14 December,
two pig farms in Yeoncheon and Yangju in northern Gyeonggi‐do, belonged to the same owner,
also reported FMD suspected animals. The nationwide spread of FMD was imminent. The
epidemic continued until April of the next year [8]. The status of an FMD‐free country with
vaccination was recognized by the OIE on 27 May 2014, 3 years after the last cases of the
epidemics in April 2011. The approval was obtained after the review of the report, submitted
on October 2013, which verified the non‐circulation of FMD virus for more than a year based
on a test of non‐structural protein (NSP) antibodies in vaccinated animals.
Implementation of a vaccine containing inactivated O1 Manisa strain (monovalent) was
urgently implemented. Injections were first administered on 25 December 2010, to cattle near
the outbreak areas. Vaccination of pigs was first implemented on 6 January 2011. The program
was gradually extended, and all cattle and pigs in Korea were subject to injection from 15
January 2011. The second set of injections was started on 23 January in cattle and 3 February
in pigs, respectively, and completed by 26 February. In the case of pigs, the outbreak decreased
remarkably 3 weeks after primary vaccination, while in the case of cattle, it decreased after 2
weeks. From 3 March, additional vaccination was implemented to animals born without
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maternal antibodies because they were born before the beginning of vaccination, and pigs at
3–4 weeks before delivery. And deer and goats were also added to the vaccine object. Since
September 2011, it was mandatory for all cloven‐hoofed animals to be implemented with
trivalent (O, A, Asia 1) vaccination by 6‐month interval. Before nationwide vaccination, all
animals in the outbreak farm were stamped out. However, after 27 January 2011, when the
nationwide vaccination was successfully completed, only animals showing symptoms or a
positive reaction were stamped out [8].
2.6. Epidemic in July to August 2014
On 23 July 2014, the suspected animals were reported from 1 pig farm with 1,500 animals in
Euseong, Gyeongsangbuk‐do. The presence of FMD virus was confirmed in the next morning.
Clinical signs appeared in unvaccinated animals in that farm. Subsequently, FMD was
diagnosed in two more farms by 6 August 2014 [9].
2.7. Epidemic in December 2014 to April 2015
After 4 months, on 3 December 2014, a veterinarian of a farm with 15,884 animals in Jincheon,
Chungcheongbuk‐do, observed vesicles and ataxia in 30 pigs and reported the same to the
county office. FMD was confirmed on the next day. During the next 147 days, until 28 April
2015, 180 pig farms and 5 cattle farms were confirmed with FMD [9].
3. On farm investigation
3.1. Regulation associated to investigation
In the Republic of Korea, in case of FMD outbreak, control measures are implemented based
on the investigation of outbreak epidemiology. Both investigation and control measures were
stipulated by the Act on the Prevention of Contagious Animal Diseases, the FMD Control
Guidelines, and the standard operation procedure for FMD. These regulations include
notification of suspected cases, movement control, stamping‐out, disinfection, regular and
emergency vaccination, import quarantine, disposal, compensation, and penalties [8, 9].
3.2. Principle of investigation
A smart investigation on the epidemiology of outbreak is crucial in order to implement control
measures in case of confirming FMD. In case of FMD outbreak, the veterinary epidemiology
division of the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (QIA) took overall responsibility for the
epidemiological investigation throughout Korea. Field investigation and contact tracing were
performed for each outbreak farm and putative dangerous contacts. All movements in‐and‐
out associated with animals, people, vehicles, and materials were investigated for each farm
for at least 21‐day period (14 days in case of vaccination) immediately before the outbreak date.
Then, the forward‐and‐backward tracings, which list up all the places visited before and after
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being at the outbreak farm, were performed for each visitor, resident, and worker related to
the farm [10].
3.3. Example of field investigation in Korea
A template to guide epidemiological investigation on the outbreak site is is prepared. The
investigation process includes three steps: confirming infection, estimating date of first
infection and determining mode of introduction. Below is example of investigation on FMD
outbreak in Korea.
3.3.1. Confirming infection
FMD suspected animals were reported from a pig farm with 1,552 pigs in two houses located
adjacent to buildings of pork‐processing plant, on 2 June 2002. FMD outbreak in this farm was
confirmed on 3 June, based on serological and virological tests.
3.3.2. Estimating date of first infection
In the late evening of 1 June, one of the farm workers notified “something abnormal on the
hooves of the growing pigs to the owner. O the next morning, upon reporting of the owner,
staffs of QIA (it was named National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, NVRQS, at
that time) visited the site and observed intact vesicles (nasal plane, oral cavity, and coronary
band), ruptured vesicles (coronary band), lameness, anorexia, and fever on nine animals
examined in detail. Based on the number of animals with clinical signs and the age of the oldest
lesion, the first clinical sign was estimated to have been developed since 7 days. Considering
the incubation time of 4 days (a range of 2–14 days), FMD virus infection in this herd was the
most likely to start on on 22 May (12 May at the earliest to 24 May at the latest)s.
3.3.3. Determining mode of introduction
Through field investigation and tracing, a total of 229 farms had contacts with this out‐
break farm during 21‐day period before the notification, either via people or vehicles vis‐
ited to this farm or via slaughterhouse to which pigs were sent from this farm. No pigs
had been introduced onto this farm. Preemptive slaughter was undertaken on three farms
having epidemiological associations: One farm had dangerous contact such as sharing a
common pig‐transport truck, and the other two were located within 3‐km distance from
the outbreak farm.
A direct link was identified between this farm, reported on 2 June and the index farm,
reported on 2 May. There was a person (man) worked at the neighboring pork‐processing
plant on a part‐time basis, which was operated by the same owner with the outbreak
farm. He has also participated in the culling operations on the index farm during three
consecutive days from 3 May. He drove his car to the local animal health service then
transported to the slaughter site, in wearing a T‐shirt, a pair of blue jeans, and a pair of
boots. At the slaughter site, disposable work‐suit and boot covers were provided. After
completing the operation, he cleaned himself at a public bath together with other work‐
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ers. Then, he put new underwear and shirts provided by the local government. But, he
put again the same trouser that he wore in working because he had no spare one. While
he took a bath, his jean was wrapped in a vinyl bag after being sprayed disinfectant. He
returned back home by his own car in which no disinfection measures were implemented.
He worked at the port‐processing plant for three or four occasions, starting on 8 May.
FMD virus was probably transmitted by this person considering that the index farm, on
which 330 (4.0%) of 8,302 pigs showed clinical signs or died at the time of culling, was
heavily contaminated at the time of culling. FMD virus must survive in environment such
as interior of his car, and transmitted to the pork‐processing plant and adjacent pig hous‐
es during 17 days of interval between the completion of culling (5 May) and the most like‐
ly date of first infection (22 April) [10].
4. Clinical signs
By carrying out epidemiological investigation, we can estimate how long has the disease
been on the farm, where did the disease come from, and where the disease might have
spread to. To establish a likely time period of infection dynamics took place in animals of
the farm, aging clinical lesions is important. Looking for the oldest lesions allows identify‐
ing the time of first infection in the herd. Clinical examination starts by taking history
about type and time of clinical signs and affected animals from the farmer. Then, the ani‐
mals from a distance to see general demeanor, salivation, lameness, or ataxia were ob‐
served. When we examine the individual animal, check the mouth (especially in cattle)
then the feet (in pigs) in order.
The clinical signs of FMD were the most clearly manifested in pigs followed by dairy cat‐
tle comparing to other species. In the epidemic of 2010/2011, only 2.6% of the dairy cattle
farms and 1.9% of the pig farms were subclinically infected, while no clinical signs of
FMD was observed in 10‐20% of the outbreak farms with beef cattle, deer, or goats. For
beef cattle, the number of farms with ulcers (n = 408, 28.6%) was higher than that showing
vesicles (n = 316, 22.2%). For dairy cattle, on the contrary, vesicles (n = 166, 32.6%) were
more frequent than ulcers (n = 107, 21.0%) in dairy cattle farms. In 58.9% of the pig farms,
vesicle was the most dominant sign of FMD. In pigs, more severe signs, such as lameness
or ataxia (14.6%) and shedding of claws (4.6%), were also distinctively shown. Another
clinical characteristic observed in the 2010/2011 FMD epidemic was sudden death of suck‐
ling piglets, which was observed in 21.2% of pig farms. The average age of the oldest
lesion in an outbreak farm was higher in the vaccinated than the non‐vaccinated in cattle,
while it was higher in non‐vaccinated in pigs. Considering that vaccination was firstly
performed on cattle then on pigs, and the outbreaks continued only in pig farms at the
later phase of the epidemic, difference of lesions’ age between cattle and pig at detecting
seemed mainly associated with farmers’ attention and recognition [11].
In the epidemic of 2014/2015, any clinical signs of FMD were observed in all of the 185 outbreak
farms. Vesicles, which were observed 65.0% of the outbreak pig farms, were the most promi‐
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nent clinical signs, followed by lameness (43.9%), ataxia (38.9%), and hemorrhage in hooves
(25.0%) [9].
5. Detection of outbreak farms
Detection of outbreak farm signifies the start of implementing control measures by animal
health service. Large number of outbreak farms in the epidemics of 2010/2011 and
2014/2015 were attributed to the late detection of the infection, and FMD virus was al‐
ready spread out at the time of confirming the index case [8, 9].
5.1. Delayed detection
In case of the 2010/2011 epidemic, implementation of control measures was delayed due to
inappropriate diagnosis. When the first suspected case was reported on 23 November 2010,
the NSP antibody test was conducted on the clinically suspected animals which had not yet
developed NSP antibody, and negative results were drawn. Three days later, when the farmer
notified the abnormalities for the second time, antibody test confirmed negative results again.
Antibodies can be detected by enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay(ELISA) test from 3–5 days
after appearing clinical signs of FMD. Finally, FMD was confirmed in isolating virus through
reverse transcription‐polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR) by the QIA from the specimen taken
on 28 November [12].
5.2. Early detection
On the contrary, prompt diagnosis contributed to the reduction of disease spread in the
epidemic of 2002. From 9 May, 1 week after the confirmation of the first case, pen‐side
antigen test, which can detect FMD virus in vesicular fluids, was used for FMD suspect
cases. This test enabled confirmation of infection to be made on the farm in about 20 min.
Stamping out was implemented based on clinical examination (observing vesicles in most
cases) and the pen‐side antigen test results even before laboratory confirmation was made
in some cases. During this epidemic, 13 of the 16 outbreak farms were culled within 24 h
of diagnosis, which was an important factor in reducing the spread of the disease [6].
5.3. Probability of detection
The probability of early detection was the highest for pig farms, followed by dairy and beef
cattle farms, and small ruminant farms in the case of the 2010/2011 epidemic. Almost 90% of
the infected farms were detected by Day 11 of post‐infection for pig farms, by Day 13 for
both dairy and beef cattle farms, and by Day 21 for small ruminant farms. As far as con‐
cerned to the detection delay, that was time passed prior to the detection of FMD infection
on a farm (average ± standard deviation), was 8.1 ± 3.1 days. The detection delays were
shortest for pig farms (7.1 ± 2.5 days) and longest for deer farms where a large variation was
also observed (14.4 ± 8.1 days) [13].
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6. Epidemiological characteristics of FMD epidemics
Throughout the seven epidemics occurred since 2000, pig and cattle were the main species
affected by FMD outbreak. The main factors of virus transmission were associated with the
movement of vehicles, behaviors of people, and distribution of materials rather than move‐
ment of animals. Epidemics started in winter were usually long and large. The cold and dry
winter climate in Korea made favorable condition for surviving FMD virus. In addition, low
temperature during the winter might have preserved FMD virus for longer periods. Disin‐
fecting farms, vehicles, and tools wasn’t effective because the low temperature let disinfectants
freeze. The hygiene status of livestock farms remained poor and animal disease could spread
widely and rapidly. Epidemics of the 2010/2011 and 2014/2015 were the cases.
6.1. Characteristics of epidemic in 2002
The index case of the 2002 epidemic was notified on 2 May 2002. The next day, on 3 May, the
second outbreak was notified at a pig farm in 25 km away from the index case. Based on the
epidemiological investigation, FMD virus was probably spread from the index case to the
second outbreak farm by a salesperson of a veterinary pharmaceutical company. Subsequently
developed two spatial clusters centered of these farms and all known outbreak farms were
encompassed except for one case. Genetic analysis of virus isolates from all of 15 outbreak
farms, except for one from which no viral isolate was obtained, suggested that they had
originated from a single common source. Herd serial interval of disease transmission at farm
level was 8–9 (average ± standard deviation, 9.1 ± 2.0, median 8.5) days, and the transmission
was extended into five generations. Eight farms were already infected before detecting the
index case. A study on simulation modeling on various control strategy for the epidemic in
2002 suggested that the prompt implementation of control measures is the most effective in
reducing both size and duration of future outbreaks [14].
6.2. Characteristics of epidemic in January 2010
The index case farm for the epidemic of January 2010 employed a foreigner, entered Korea on
October 2009, as a farm hand. Disinfection or other biosecurity measures had not been taken
before starting work on that farm. Furthermore, a parcel was delivered to the person above‐
mentioned from his country on November 2009. In 2009, countries in northeast Asia had
numerous outbreaks reported of FMD serotype A. Considering these findings, employment
of a foreign worker in the first outbreak farm was identified as a possible route of virus
introduction into Korea. FMD virus was subsequently transmitted to other farms through local
veterinarian's examination, farmers’ meeting, and farm owner's visit to the infected area [15].
The honest report of the local veterinarian his visiting places allowed to detect potential
infections in early stage then promptly implement control measures. Unlikely to other
epidemics during winter, heavy snow of early January 2010 in the outbreak area helped to
restrict moving vehicles. So the spread of virus could be minimized.
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6.3. Characteristics of epidemic in April to May 2010
Investigation for the epidemic from April to May 2010 identified possible routes of between‐
farm transmission were mostly associated with livestock related vehicles including contami‐
nated feed‐delivery vehicles, artificial inseminators, and delivery of veterinary pharmaceutics,
total mixed ration (TMR) feed. Meetings of livestock‐related people, visits to contaminated
regions, vehicle movements, sales agents of animal feed companies, and participants of
livestock culling seemed also contributed [15].
6.4. Characteristics of epidemic in November 2010 to April 2011
In the epidemic from November 2010 to April 2011, the routes of FMD virus introduction
and their estimated frequencies for the 152 subsequent outbreaks except for the index case
pig‐farming complex were visitors (105, 69.1%), farmers (23, 15.1%), local spread (18,
11.8%), and delivered materials (6, 3.9%). Six outbreak farms, for which virus pathway
was attributed to visitors, were associated with treatment or manipulation of artificial in‐
semination, and 14 outbreaks were due to vehicles transporting live animals. The initial
contributing factor of the 2010/2011 nationwide FMD epidemic was the regional feature of
Andong, Gyeongsangbuk‐do, where the residents were closely related to each other. Dur‐
ing the epidemic, the frequent contacts might help the virus spread rapidly out to adja‐
cent areas. The main cause of the long‐distance virus’ spread to the northern Gyeonggi‐do
was presumed to be related to the transport of pig manure to be used to installation test
of a manure treatment machine. On 17 November 2010, pig manure from the pig complex
in Andong was sent to the developer of the manure drying machine in Paju, Gyeonggi‐
do. The FMD virus already had been spread to nearby farms in the northern Gyeonggi‐do
area before any preventive measure was taken. The first outbreak in northern Gyeonggi‐
do was occurred on the same day of 14 December 2010 in two farming sites with a large
number of pigs, operated by a same owner. Many farms raising cattle or pigs existed
nearby, and shared road. Through traffic in front of the farms, the virus spread quickly to
nearby areas. The FMD outbreak in the densely located big farms led to difficulties in
taking emergency control measures due to the lack of burial sites and slaughter person‐
nel. These caused FMD spread widely [8].
6.5. Characteristics of epidemic in December 2014 to April 2015
During the outbreak of December 2014 to April 2015, FMD virus was introduced into 185
outbreak farms mostly by vehicles (143 cases, 78.9%), people (23 cases, 10.8%), local
spread (16 cases, 8.6%), and movement of animals (3 cases, 1.6%) in the descending order.
The pathways for spreading the virus to farms in other counties included (1) visits by
vehicles (or drivers) contaminated at abattoirs, (2) vehicles (or drivers) visiting numerous
farms, (3) distribution of infected animals to other farms, (4) distribution of feed from a
factory affiliated to a large company to farms in various provinces, and (5) operation of
two or more farms located in different provinces by one person (or members of the same
family or an affiliated company). Meanwhile, delivery of veterinary pharmaceuticals, de‐
livery of semen for artificial insemination, and transport of manure were associated with
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transmission within the same county or province. Vehicles and people, responsible for the
introduction of FMD virus into farms, were contaminated at abattoirs (75 cases, 40.5%);
livestock facilities (93 cases, 50.3%), including feed factories (17 cases, 9.7%); previous out‐
break farms (67 cases, 36.2%); and infected areas (24 cases, 13.0%). FMD outbreaks contin‐
ued for a long time since December 2014 because of the following reasons: (1) The virus
continued to replicate among farms where animals were partially slaughtered; (2) the
number of subsequent outbreak farms was inversely related to the proportion of FMD
vaccine antibodies at county level; (3) control measures were not implemented at proper
times Because farmers were reluctant to report suspected cases; and (4) outbreaks began
in December, at the beginning of winter, during which the conditions were favorable for
virus survival [9].
7. Economic Impacts of FMD outbreaks
The cost of each epidemic varied from 26 billion Korean won (KRW, approximately US$ 23.6
million) at the lowest to 2044 billion KRW (US$ 1.9 billion) at the highest. The cost was the
highest for the 2000 epidemic, to which vaccination to slaughter policy was implemented to
control outbreaks of 15 cattle farms. Mean cost attributed to one outbreak cattle farm was
18.2 billion KRW. In 2002, January 2010 and April to May 2010 epidemics with slaughter
without vaccination costed 6.6 billion KRW, 4.4 billion KRW, and 9.2 billion KRW, respectively.
Then, vaccination‐to‐live policy dragged the lowest costs of 0.5 billion for the 2010/2011 and
0.3 billion for the 2014/2015 epidemic [16].
The highest cost of an outbreak of FMD reached in cattle farms. Average costs per infected
premises were 7.0 billion KRW for cattle farms (95% confidence interval, CI = 4.72–9.28), 1.38 
billion KRW for pig farms (95% CI = 0.88–1.87), 0.11 billion KRW for deer [16].
8. Surveillance
The surveillance system consists of passive epidemiological surveillance for investigating
reported disease and active epidemiological surveillance that involves serological surveillance.
The latter can be further divided into statistically designed surveillance and purposive
surveillance focusing on targeted samples within host populations. On the other hand, clinical
surveillance included clinical inspection And telephone calls. Emergency vaccination was
launched in end of December, the middle of the 2010/2011 epidemic. And Only animals with
positive reaction or showing clinical signs of FMD were slaughtered. The NSP antibody test
on the outbreak farm was conducted together with clinical inspection at 3 weeks after the
partial slaughter. The NSP antibody tests were conducted on all cattle, deer, and goats. In pig
farms, all sows and three fattening pigs per pen were subjected to be tested. This test was
aiming at getting rid of movement restriction on the outbreak farm. After 26 March 2011, the
effective preventive measures at the site: clinical, serological (16 animals per farm), and
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environmental antigen tests were conducted on cattle, deer, and goats, and clinical examination
and environmental antigen test were conducted on pigs.
Post‐vaccination seroprevalence must be examined on vaccinated animals. This can be
performed using commercial diagnostic kits. Sera are collected from farms and slaughter‐
houses. Purpose of this serological surveillance is to assure the OIE Code for FMD states that
all vaccinated animals should develop at least 80% protective immunity to be recognized as a
FMD‐free country with vaccination [12].
9. Data management
Korea Animal Health Integrated System (KAHIS) is in operation since January 2013. This
system contains all data concerning livestock and animal health in Korea. Data on farm (owner,
geolocation, farm type, animals), livestock‐related facilities (slaughter house, feed factory or
feed distribution center, manured disposal plant, livestock market, veterinary clinics, veteri‐
nary pharmaceutical agencies, semen for artificial insemination distribution center, etc.) and
vehicles transporting (animals, raw milk, eggs, veterinary pharmaceutics, feed, feces, manure,
rice husks) and for the use of personnel (veterinarian, artificial inseminator, consultant,
specimen taking and control, machine mender) are available. When a vehicle visits farm or
livestock‐related facility, the receiver installed on the site recognized the signal from the
geographical positioning system (GPS) tracking device attached to the vehicle. A real time
inquiry can be made on data of visit record both on the aspects of farm and vehicles. In addition,
all the pathway of a vehicle can be traced. This web‐based system is available at http://
www.kahis.go.kr [17].
10. Conclusion
During the epidemic of 2010/2011, FMD virus had already widely spread before detect‐
ing the index case and it induced unprecedentedly large number of outbreak. The ani‐
mal health service of Korea failed to respond timey and adequately due to lack of
experience of controlling a massive epidemic of FMD with emergency vaccination to
live. In the same manner, another big epidemic was occurred in 2014/2015 under routine
vaccination.
As mentioned in the example of the 2002 epidemic, prompt implementation of control
measures (e.g. removal of virus reservoirs), immediately after an early detection is the most
effective to control FMD. The key determinant of the early detection is the report. In reality, an
immediate report subsequent to recognizing abnormality is the collaboration with local
veterinarians, related industries and animal health services. And this collaboration can be
achieved upon proper education.
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